PEACE:
Foreign Policy & Terrorism | August 16, 2005
IRAQ
ISN'T.
(OR
HOW ALADDIN BUSH CAN'T GET
THE
ETHNIC GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE)
By
Douglas Drenkow, "Progressive
Thinking" As
Posted in "GordonTalk"
and "Comments
From Left Field"
I have a confession to make
(It's a Catholic thing): Even though it'd be a big feather in
George Bush's cap -- and might seem to justify an illegal war --
I really do hope that the Iraqi people resolve their
differences, write a good constitution, form a stable
government, and let our troops come home sometime before they
qualify for military pensions.
But despite incredibly intense
pressure from an increasingly desperate Bush Administration (Only
27% of Americans now think George Dubya's a man with a plan to
fix the mess in Iraq), the deadline for the Iraqis to draft
their constitution has come and gone. Fortunately, the Iraqi
National Assembly voted just before the midnight deadline (which
if missed would have forced a dissolution of the Assembly and a
new round of elections, a failure that would have undoubtedly
emboldened the insurgents) to extend the deadline by a week.
Unfortunately, the possibility of failure still looms large, as they
cannot even agree about what they disagree about (and
sometimes as passions "cool down", positions
harden).
Now, I realize that "democracy
is a messy thing" (as Paul Wolfowitz infamously
testified, when things first started going to hell in Iraq,
right after we liberated Baghdad...and turned it over to mob
rule) and that if Saddam Hussein were to have gone about the
business of writing a new constitution, there would be no chance
of missing deadlines (there would just be lines of missing dead
opponents).
However, there are several
ominous reasons to believe that Iraq is now less a Pottery Barn
-- in which breakage can be dealt with by throwing lots of money
at the problem -- and more a Humpty Dumpty -- for whom all the
King's horses and all the King's men...
Just take a look at the
breakdown of the three major issues, the breakdown of the
nation-state of Iraq; the Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs are
forming alliances with and against one another that shift from
issue to issue, like the sands of the Iraqi desert:
1) Islamic Law & the
Status of Women: Most of the Shiites want secular law to be
based upon Sharia,
religious law, with their Marjariya council of ayatollahs beyond
the reach of the civil authorities. Most of the Kurds, who are
Sunnis, want secular law to be merely inspired by religious
precepts. And the Sunni Arabs are strongly divided into secular
and religious factions. Many of the women in Iraq fear the loss
of civil rights that they've enjoyed for generations, even under
Saddam Hussein, as guaranteed by laws passed in 1959.
2) Oil Revenues: Most of
the oil is in the Shiite south, there is considerable oil in the
Kurdish north, but virtually none in the Sunni Arab west
(especially if the Kurds get the territorial boundaries drawn
they way that they want). Not surprisingly, the Shiites and
Kurds want to withhold much of their oil revenues from the
central government; the Sunni Arabs want them to share the oil
wealth, more than 95% of the income of the country.
3) Federalism: The Kurds
-- who had for years been the most oppressed under Saddam
Hussein (as with those infamous incidents of gassing...while
Saddam was still our ally), who have in recent years enjoyed
quasi-independence under the protection of our No Fly Zones, and
who have for over a century clamored for a
state of their own to unite their tens of millions of people
in Iraq and neighboring countries (including our uneasy NATO
ally of Turkey) -- want continued autonomy at least, complete
independence at most from any central authority in Iraq, a
mostly Arabic -- not Kurdish -- nation. The Shiites -- who (even
though numerically a majority) were likewise oppressed by Saddam
Hussein, who were somewhat protected by our No Fly Zones
(although how can they forget our having encouraged their
uprising after the first Gulf War, only to allow them to be
felled by Hussein into those infamous mass graves), and who are
closely aligned with the Shiite regime in neighboring Iran
(religious identity rivaling, perhaps transcending ethnic
differences, between Arabs and Persians) -- want at least as
much autonomy as the Kurds. And Sunni Arabs -- many of whom long
for "the good old days" when they enjoyed pre-eminence
under Saddam -- are divided: The moderates, the majority of
Sunni Arabs in the National Assembly, want a strong central
government, to secure the rights and revenues of their people;
the Sunni Arab radicals, the leaders of the violent insurgency,
want nothing to do with a "puppet government"
installed under the gun (both literally and figuratively) of an
occupying power.
Viewed in the harsh light that
has broken with the failure of the Iraqis to reach agreement (or
to maintain agreement) on each of these major issues, it becomes
more apparent than ever that the fundamental problem in Iraq
is...
Iraq isn't.
Even if a constitution is
drafted and approved (and the Shiites are now threatening to use
their majority in the National Assembly to force a
"compromise" down the Kurds' and Sunni Arabs'
collective throats, as an act of Shiite "benevolence"),
even if a new government is elected, even if the violence
subsides and our troops are withdrawn, there is little if any
chance that a truly democratic Iraq
will ever become a stable, united nation -- any more than the
former Yugoslavia,
another multi-ethnic state artificially created out of the
former Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War.
The "balkanization"
of Iraq -- into separate, perhaps feuding Shiite Arab, Sunni
Arab, and Kurdish Sunni regions or states -- is practically
guaranteed as a natural consequence of their competing
religious, ethnic, and historical differences.
Unless we intend on presiding
over a "shotgun wedding" of these obviously
incompatible mates -- held together for decades only by the iron
fist of Saddam Hussein, like that of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia
-- we should be prepared for the eventual break-up of Iraq.
Whether that happens peacefully
(well, relatively peacefully), through negotiations, or
violently, through outright civil war, it will almost certainly
happen.
And our hundred thousand-plus
troops will continue to be caught in the middle of this
dangerous domestic dispute. When we liberated the Iraqi people,
we also set their ancient rivalries free.
But Aladdin Bush can't get the
ethnic genie back in the bottle.
In the long run I suppose we
will have done the Iraqi people a favor, by emancipating their
three major factions from a national federation enforced by a
murderous dictatorship (although in doing so, we have killed and
maimed tens of thousands of them).
But also in the long run we
will have opened a Pandora's Box of perilous possibilities --
ranging from the revolt of Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Armenia;
the oppression of women and seculars by Shiites controlling vast
oil wealth and closely aligned with Iran (increasingly
radicalized since our Great Leader branded them part of an
"Axis of Evil", which existed only in the most
paranoid of fantasies); and the creation of a new haven for Al
Qaeda et al. in the Sunni Arab west (radicalizing many other
Sunnis, the majority in the Muslim world).
And in the short run -- and for
no one knows how long a run -- we continue to kill and die in
Mesopotamia, into whose sands has soaked the blood of countless
warriors, and those caught in the crossfire of war, since the
earliest days of recorded history.
"Civilization".
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